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stated that the business acquired comprised abouit 85 per cent. of 
the calico printing industry in Great Britain. The Association 
included nearly every leading house in the trade, and the directors 
" emphasized their opinion that as the outcome of the amalgamation 
far different and more profitable results may be confidently expected 
in the near future than have been realised for many years past." 
At the first annual meeting, the Chairman was discouraging. 
"It took many months before they fully realised the magnitude of 
the task of organising so large a company on suitable lines." 
" In plain Eniglish (the directors) were not equal to the 
task ' . . . . "The situation created . . . . was so 
novel that . . . . serious mistakes had been made." Finally, 
the results became so bad that a committee of investigation was 
appointed, and a niew board of directors was elected to carry out 
their drastic recomnmendation f reform. Thenceforward the 
organisation for three years paid 2i per cent. on its ordinary capital 
and 4 per cent. in 1905-06. "It must not be concluded," says 
Mr. Macrosty, "that the higher dividend is proof of an essentially 
stronger position. . The works in the Association have to bear 
the burden of practically paying the closed works not to compete." 
On the other hand, there are organisations, uch as those of 
Messrs. S. and P. Coats, who seem to have followed a particularly 
judicious policy from the beginning. They combined only the 
strong competitors, and trusted to their superior efficiencv and to 
the economies of concentrated manufacture to reduce the com- 
petition of outsiders to a negligible quantity." Their system of 
working enabled "every half-penny stamp to be traced," and under 
the circumstances it is scarcely surprising to read of net profits 
approaching 3,000,0001. on a capital of 12,000,0001.. and of a reserve 
fuind of 4,500,0001. 
The problem of the relationsllip of the State to these strong 
combinations i one that Mr. Mlacrosty conisiders not yet to be ripe 
for treatment, and his view is probably accurate, though it would be 
well perhaps for the State to hold a watching brief, and at all events 
to be familiar with every turn in the affairs of these industrial 
organisations. " The position of the British combination in iegard 
to the interests of the community may be summed up as not at 
present dangerous, but containing, like every new development, 
great and unknown possibilities alike for good and evil." 
Altogether Mr. Macrosty is to be cordially congratulated on the 
noteworthy contribution to historical knowledge that he has made. 
Much discrimination has been shown in the choice of material, which 
has evidently been collected with indomitable industry. But 
Mr. Mlacrosty has probably quite enjoyecl the task, for he tells us 
" hunting down an association is quite an exhilarating sport: there is 
no cover so unlikely in which the game may not be started." O.F. 
8.- Industrial Cornbination. By D. H. Macgregor, M.A. 
245 pp., 8vo. London: George Bell and Sons, 1906. 
From the detached ground of English soil "where truists and 
cartels have not vet become a matter of public agitation," from 
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the still more detached atmosphere of Trinity College, Cambridge, 
where the fierce shouts of the conflict of the world's indust-rial 
armies can only distantly be heard, comes this calm and acutely 
reasoned analysis of the present situation. 
Industrial combination - in Mr. Macgregor's view - is not 
monopolistic. To allege that combination has superseded com- 
petition, urges Mr. Macgregor, is " untrue both in fact and in 
analysis." The strongest industrial combination, in order to hold 
its position, " requires to maintain the strongest competitive force 
within its own structure," and " in the external market it employs 
against its rivals competitive methods of exceptional severity. 
There is no competition like that between one or two great 
organisations." 
Moreover, it is pointed out that combination does not necessarily 
affect the ethical duties of man to man. As in indepenldent com- 
petition, such practices as rebates, boycotts, and discriminated 
prices flourish, and combination-or as it might perhaps more 
accurately be termed, associated competition-tends to accentuate 
these practices. Combination is not necessarily more moral nor 
less moral than individual action. It is only more powerful either 
for moralisation or for extortion. This is in a sense true, but 
perhaps gives hardly sufficient allowance to the spirit of comrade- 
ship and human sympathy which grows up between the workers 
in all large industrial organisations that sometimes tends to modify 
for a time the strict scientific working of the law of economic 
necessity. 
Mr. Macgregor rightly iinsists on the view that industrial 
combination is not a new form of organisation that has sprunig 
up and supplanted the "natural system of competition." Com- 
petition, he urges, is the essence of any and every economic 
system. It has various methods of working-" the independent 
or the combined method or mixtures of the two." "Industrial 
competition . . . is a competitive method based on that 
foresight by which the Darwinian Law is qualified in the sphere 
of human activity . . . The type which survives and is repre- 
sentative of its period owes its position to its strengtb as a 
competitor, on its power to take as well as on its power to give 
advantage." 
The factors of competing strength are analysed under the 
heads of " productive efficiency," "risk," " bargaining strength," and 
" resource," in four carefully argued chapters. 
The causes which operate in the formation of trusts and cartels 
are then examined, and it is pointed out that in over-capitalised 
industries the absence of agreement among the producers will, 
under conditions of decreasing cost, lead to a price-war in which 
business is conducted by many firms at a loss; . . . or, again, in a 
rising market, each individual firm may be afraid to raise its prices 
lest the others do not follow. . . . The ups and downs, the 
fluctuations and uncertainties so created, will suggest to producers 
the remedy of agreement or association to regulate price and output, 
and avoid wasteful competition. 
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To form an effective trust or cartel the following conditions are 
thought o be necessary: 
1. The parties should be few enough in number to come to 
terms readily. 
2. They should be near one another. 
3. There shall not be great differences inthe competing strength 
of the firms which combine. 
4. There should be some degree of uniformity inthe products of 
the firms. 
5. Previous opportunities for communication between the 
combining parties are held to facilitate the process of 
formation. 
6. In early stages the help of capital is required. 
A good deal of attention is given to the question of,. the influence 
of tariffs on industrial combination. He distinguishes between a 
protective tariff and an over-protective tariff. A tariff is held to 
be simply protective when it does no more than enable the pro- 
tected country to become the producer of certain goods. It is held 
to become over-protective when it does more than establish these 
producers and affords them a margin for raising their prices above 
full cost price. He is inclined to the view that "simple protection" 
is comparatively harmless, but through economies peculiar to the 
protected parties it may result in over-protection, which does not 
always conduce to the benefit of a country. " Although it is 
important not to exaggerate the influence of tariffs," holds Mr. 
Macgregor, "yet they have a strong influence whose theoretical 
basis is plain, and which spreads further than is at once apparent. 
Combination which is based on the tariff, or on objective 
conditions created by human institutions, is liable to be rendered 
unstable as these institutions are continually modified and revised." 
In these days of steadily-increasing prices of commodities, it is 
interesting to read Mr. Macgregor's views of the effect of these 
industrial combinations upon prices. When the causes contributing 
to the combinations are reasons of defence or aggression, the effect 
will appear in a r.gime of higher prices. " Prices will rule high, not 
only in relation to the abnormally low prices due to excessive com- 
petition, but with reference to normal conditions." 
But high prices, even if steady, are not necessarily an advantage. 
To ascertain their real effect it becomes necessary to trace their 
effects on industry generally. Their effect is to reduce the con- 
sumer's purchasing power for other foods, and to lead elsewhere to 
crisis from under-consumption. In such a conditioin of affairs the 
" other industries " may cartel themselves and make their prices in 
turn higher and steadier. The result is a higher level all over the 
market. Mr. Macgregor shows how, by the interplay of forces, this 
result is almost inevitable. He holds, however, that it should be 
within the power of combination to steady prices without he quite 
inconsequent operation of putting them up. Steadiness is thought 
to have little economic meaning if it goes with a higher level of 
prices. 
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Mr. Macgregor goes on to discuss the economic effect upon the 
producer of the policy of selling in foreign markets at a loss, and 
he concludes that this may not be good if, in a national market 
controlled by strong combinations, the point of greatest profit is 
reached before the full tariff is made effective on price. " But if 
the limit allowed by the tariff is reached first, so that prices cannot 
vary upwards, the consumers may possibly gain, as well as the 
combination, by this policy if pursued under conditions of decreasing 
cost." 
In so thoughtful a book as this, especial interest attaches to the, 
author's analysis of the relationship of the State to industrial 
combinations. 
He is impressed with the evident dangers. "A strong com- 
bination for the productionl of a staple commodity gives to a few 
men, who may have no other motive than private interest, an 
invidious power over national ife and work." "It is an evil thing 
when trade influences creep into the legislature, anjd private interests 
are made cumulatively stronger by their power to obtain secret or 
open protection or concession." "The domination of industrial 
magnates is felt to endanger the virility of social life, and to relax 
the standards of every-day morality." Public opinion is not an 
adequate safeguard, and a new measure of active attention is 
required from the State. 
The State may act as consumer, producer and legislator. As 
consumer, its powers of regulation are held to be only slight. On 
the question of organised State production, he does not admit the 
public ownership of commodities like water, gas and electricity 
constitutes a precedent, as these goods, though theoretically trans- 
ferable in character, actually are non-transferable, as they need " a 
prepared way to be laid out over the whole area supplied," which 
way "is of no use to carry any commodity except one, so that its 
whole cost falls on the producer of that commodity." This condition 
of things "leads to narrow markets, and a strong tendency to 
decreasing cost within those markets." " The price of gas in 
Bristol would have to rise very high before it would be worth 
while to pack it in cylinders and send it from London." The 
whole market becomes, therefore, split up into local and non- 
competing monopolies. 
These special considerations are held not to apply to goods 
which move freely over national or international markets. With 
regard to their industries, he finds himself confronted with a 
dilemma, "either the State must take them over one by one as 
economic forces consolidate them, but in this case the dangers of 
municipal trade, the influencing of public officials on behalf of 
private interests affected, will appear on a national scale-or it 
must wait until the industry least liable to combination is 
combined." This he feels to be impracticable. Grave difficulties 
would, in his judgment ensue, if public policy were to regard 
combination as antecedent to socialisation, but it is from the 
foreign relations of governments hat his final attitude towards a 
socialist development of economic combination is derived. " There 
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is no time, so long as the international stress lasts, and occupies the 
best energies of legislatures, for industrial socialism." The burden 
.of government would be intolerably increased if new officials were 
,answerable to the legislature for all the complications of the conduct 
,of national industries." He submits finally that " neither inductive 
nor deductive reasoning can be used fairly to assimilate the industries 
in which the problems of combination are pressing to those which 
.already have silently come into the hands of public authorities." 
He then considers what measures, short of ownership, the State 
,an take, and, after consideration of the arguments, concludes that 
the State cannot without danger either forbid, or circumscribe, or
by special inquisitorial registration sanction, the combination move- 
ment. " There is then left for it only the duty of -ensuring that the 
movement will owe its success or failure to the action of the openest 
competition with other methods," and the author closes a book- 
wherein early every word has a measured value-with the following 
-opinion: "If the combination movement comes to realise itself 
fully in time, so that industry concentrates to a high degree its 
strength, its risks, its powers for good, and its powers for harm, 
then, to revert to the metaphor of leadership, a nation's best 
hope is 'that a better conception of the place and dignity of 
industry may induce the best men of the nation to become captains 
in this war."' O.F. 
9.-Le Condizioni Generali della Classe Operaia in Milano. Salari, 
Giornate di Lavoro, PBeddito, ecc. (Pubblicazioni dell' Ufficio del 
Lavoro della Societa Umanitaria, Numero 15). 254 pp., 4to. 
Milano, 1907. 
This volume contains the belated results of an investigation, 
instituted in the summer of 1903, into the general conditions of the 
working classes of Milan. This inquiry was undertaken by the 
Labour Department of the Humanitarian Society, at the instigation 
of the Trades Council, who desired to obtain statistical details 
as to wages, hours of labour, piece work, &c., for the use of the 
warious labour organisations represented on the Council, while the 
Humanitarian Society sought at the same time to procure precise 
information as to the extent of the dearth of employment as a 
,guide in the adoption of measures for the relief of the unemployed. 
As the Municipal Council of Milan had also decided to make an 
-inquiry into the housing and sanitary accommodation, arrangements 
were made for the simultaneous delivery and collection of the 
.schedules of questions relating to both inquiries. The persons to 
iwhom the schedules were distributed were asked to make their 
,answers relate to 1st July, 1903. At the end of June meetings 
were held in the working class districts to explain the objects of 
the investigations, and circulars were issued intimating that 
authorised persons would attend on certain evenings at the local 
schools to complete the scheduiles for those who were unable to 
understand them. 
The schedule issued by the Labour Department contained sixteen 
questions, in which the worker was asked, inter alia, to state his 
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